The Domestic Political Costs of Soliciting Foreign Electoral Intervention

When would voters punish politicians for soliciting foreign help to win an election? We used survey experiments to study this question. Our experiments offer a mixed message about public willingness to defend democracy against external interference. On the one hand, the vast majority of voters—from both major parties—were unwilling to defect from candidates who solicited. Candidates could further reduce the domestic costs of soliciting by approaching allies rather than nonallies, refraining from explicit quid pro quos, recruiting elites to defend their behavior, and cultivating uncertainty. On the other hand, candidates who sought foreign help lost support on average, and in many situations the penalty could be sizable enough to sway an election. Our experiments therefore suggest that a small but consequential sliver of the electorate would punish candidates who solicit, and could influence whether and how politicians invite foreign meddling in future races. Jessica L. P. Weeks is Professor of Political Science and H. Douglas Weaver Chair in Diplomacy and International Relations in the Department of Political Science at UW-Madison. Her research has appeared in journals including the American Political Science Review, the Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, International Organization, and World Politics. Her book, Dictators at War and Peace, explores the domestic politics of international conflict in dictatorships. Weeks was the 2018 recipient of the International Studies Association Karl Deutsch Award, recognizing the scholar under 40 who has made the most significant contribution to the study of international relations. Professor Weeks received a B.A. in political science from The Ohio State University in 2001, a Master’s degree in international history from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in 2003, and a PhD in political science from Stanford University in 2009.